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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathan W. Ellington appeals from the district court's order denying his
motion for a new trial.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state previously described the underlying fact~ as follows: 1
At 3:30 [a.m.], Ellington got in a disagreement with his live-in
girlfriend and drove his Chevy Blazer, which had no license plates,
to Ronald Cunningham's house on Sacrcello Road to drink beer
and watch TV. Ellington arrived at his friend's residence at 6:00
[a.m.]. Upon leaving the Cunningham residence in his Blazer,
Ellington ended up behind a white Honda. The occupants of the
Honda were two girls: Javon and Joleen Larsen. Javon was 22
years old and Joleen was 18. Javon was taking Joleen back to her
parents' home.
Ellington appeared upset that the Honda was driving slow
and he was unable to pass her because of an on-coming vehicle.
After the on-coming vehicle passed, Ellington sped-up, passed the
Honda, and then stopped at the next intersection. Ellington got out
of the Blazer, approached the car, swore at Javon and Joleen,
challenged them to a fight, and punched the Honda's window on
the driver's side. The girls called 911 and, not being able to give a
license description to the 911 operator, followed Ellington.
Ellington, aware that the girls were following him and believing that
the girls had or were going to call the police, drove past his home
and turned around. After turning around, Ellington drove his vehicle
in the wrong lane directly at the girls, swerving at the last instant
into the other lane. Ellington was ultimately able to lose the girls
who were still on the phone with the 911 operator. After losing
sight of Ellington, the girls waited for an officer from the sheriff's
department. During this time the 911 call ended and the girls called
their parents, Joel and Vonette Larsen. A sheriffs deputy arrived,
gave them a witness statement form to fill out, and left to
investigate. The girls' parents, driving a maroon Subaru, also
arrived at the location. They also left to look for the Blazer.

1

Ellington's retrial established substantially similar facts. (See generally Trial Tr.)
1

After losing the girls, Ellington returned to his home where
he got in yet another disagreement with his girlfriend. After
Ellington's girlfriend left to go to a friend's house, Ellington got back
in his Blazer and drove back by the location where Javon and
Joleen [were filling] out their police paperwork. Ellington flipped
them off as he passed them. The two girls got back on the phone
with the 911 operator to inform the police that Ellington was back
on the road and that they were following Ellington a second time -this time with their parents following close behind.
Ellington was traveling at very high speeds driving back
toward the residence on Scarcello Road where he had been earlier.
Ellington drove past the residence around a curve and then turned
around. The girls stopped their Honda in front of Ellington's Blazer;
the girls' parents pulled up in front of the Honda in the Subaru. As
the Subaru was coming to a stop, Ellington drove around the
driver's side of the Subaru, clipped it with the side of his vehicle,
and rammed the Honda with Joleen and Javon inside -accelerating and driving the Honda across the road approximately
forty-five feet until the car's wheels furrowed in the dirt. The girls'
mother, Vonette Larsen, got out of the vehicle and ran in the
direction of the Honda. Joel Larsen also exited the vehicle and
removed a handgun that was in the vehicle. Joel also ran to where
the Blazer had rammed the Honda. Joel Larson never made it to
the Honda. Ellington, after pushing the Honda all the way across
the road, reversed the Blazer back on the road. Ellington made a
hard left and accelerated toward Vonette Larsen who was still
running to the Honda. As the Blazer traveled toward Vonette
Larsen, in an attempt to stop the Blazer from hitting his wife, Joel
Larsen shot the passenger side front panel of the Blazer. The shot
had no effect on the path of the vehicle. Ellington hit Vonette
Larsen with his Blazer causing her body to come down on the hood
of the Blazer and then to the ground where she was ultimately run
over and killed. The entire incident was recorded by the 911
operator who was on the phone with Joleen Larsen.
After Ellington ran over Vonette Larsen, he left the scene
and returned to the Cunningham residence. Ellington went inside
where he continued to drink and watched football on the television.
Law enforcement eventually located his Blazer at the residence and
subsequently placed Ellington under arrest.
(#33843 2 Appellant's Brief, pp.1-4 (citations omitted)).

Ellington's August 14, 2013 motion to take judicial notice of the record in
Ellington's prior appeal, #33843, remains pending before the Court.

2

2

The state charged Ellington with second-degree murder for running over
and killing Vonette Larsen with his Blazer, and two counts of aggravated battery
for striking the Larsen daughters' Honda. (#33843 R., Vol. /, pp.127-129.) After
a trial, the jury found Ellington guilty of each charge. (#33843 R. Vol. II, pp.379380.)

The district court also denied Ellington's motion for a new trial. (#33843

Supp. R., pp.32-46.)
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated Ellington's convictions and
remanded the case for a new trial. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 253 P.3d
727 (2011) (hereinafter "Ellington I"). Specifically, the Court identified instances
of prosecutorial misconduct and evidentiary error, and held that the district court
abused its discretion by not granting Ellington's motion for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence that state rebuttal witness Fred Rice testified
inconsistently with his prior testimony in another case, and with training materials
he authored.

lsi.

The state retried Ellington, and the jury once again found Ellington guilty of
second-degree murder and both counts of aggravated battery. (R., pp.539-540.)
The district court imposed a unified 18-year sentence with 10 years fixed for
second-degree murder, and concurrent lesser sentences on the aggravated
battery charges. (R., pp.673-675.)
Ellington again made a motion for a new trial on several grounds.

(R.,

pp.544-546; R. Ex., pp.830-869.) Relevant to this appeal, Ellington asserted that
he was entitled to a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence that
state accident reconstruction expert witness John Daily testified inconsistently

3

with a previously-published textbook that he authored.

(R. Ex., pp.865-868.)

The district court rejected each of Ellington's claims and denied his motion for
new trial. (R., pp.821-840.) With respect to Ellington's "new evidence" claim, the
district court concluded that Ellington failed to satisfy any of the four prongs of the
controlling Drapeau 3 standard. (R. Ex., pp.836-839.) Ellington timely appealed.
(3/26/12 Notice of Appeal; see also R., p.29.)

3

State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976).

4

ISSUE
Ellington states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ellington's motion for a new
trial where there was newly-discovered evidence showing that the
State's retained accident reconstruction expert testified falsely at
Mr. Ellington's trial?
(Appel/ant's brief, p.22.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as:
Has Ellington failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial?

5

ARGUMENT
Ellington Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Motion For A New Trial

A.

Introduction
Ellington contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying

his motion for a new trial.

(See generally Appellant's brief.)

Specifically,

Ellington contends that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to meet
any of the prongs of the controlling Drapeau standard with regard to his proposed
"new evidence" consisting of excerpts from a textbook authored by state expert
witness John Daily.

(JgJ

Because Ellington has failed to show that these excerpts: (1) were
unknown to him at the time of trial; (2) could not have been discovered with due
'diligence; (3) were material to his guilt or innocence, and not merely impeaching
or cumulative; and (4) would probably have produced an acquittal, Ellington has
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's

discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley,
119 Idaho 62,63,803 P.2d 563,564 (Ct. App. 1991).

6

C.

Ellington Has Shown No Abuse of Discretion In The District Court's
Application Of The Drapeau Standard
A defendant may obtain. a new trial "[w]hen new evidence is discovered

material to the defendant, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the triaL" I.C. § 19-2406(7). In State v. Drapeau, 97
Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the fourpart test a defendant must satisfy in order to be entitled to a new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence.

That test requires a defendant to show that the

evidence offered in support of his motion for a new trial (1) is newly discovered
and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) is material, not merely
cumulative or impeaching; (3) will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure
to learn of the evidence was due to no lack of diligence on the part of the
defendant. kL at 691, 551 P.2d at 978; see also Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24,
30,995 P.2d 794,800 (2000).
In announcing this four-part test, the Court cited Professor Wright's text on
Federal Practice and Procedure and specifically noted his comment, "after a man
has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to
give him a second triaL" Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978 (citation
omitted). "Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are
disfavored and should be granted with caution, reflecting the importance
accorded to considerations of repose, regularity of decision making, and
conservation of scarce judicial resources." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144,
191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting
State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho 574,577, 165 P.3d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 2007».
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In this case, Ellington's asserted "new evidence" concerns a portion of the
testimony of state expert accident reconstruction witness John Daily.

(R. Ex.,

pp.865-868.) At trial, Daily testified that his review of the incident indicated that
the impact between Ellington's Blazer and the Subaru occupied by Joel and
Vonette Larsen was relatively insignificant, and thus could not have caused the
Blazer to rotate to such a substantial degree as to cause it to face in the direction
of the Larsen daughters' Honda, which the Blazer subsequently stuck. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. II, p.863, LA - p.928, L.17.)

The implication of this opinion was that

Ellington must have actively turned the steering wheel and accelerated in such a
manner as to intentionally strike the Larsen daughters' Honda following his
impact with the Subaru.

Daily supported this opinion by describing his

observations of damage on the impacted vehicles and visible tire marks. (ld.)
He also referenced a calculation he conducted utilizing a rotational mechanics
formula. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.891, L.15 - p.892, L.24.) Pursuant to this formula,
an impact causing the Blazer to rotate by the required 45 degrees to put it on a
collision course with the Honda "would require a speed change on the part of a
Subaru of about 41 to 42 miles an hour." (Id.) Daily testified that such a speed
change would have resulted in more extensive vehicle damage than he
observed. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.892, L.21 - p.893, L.6.) In a supplemental report
prepared shortly prior to trial, Daily identified the rotational mechanics formula he
utilized as W

=-V2Fh O/I.

(R. Ex., pp.767-771.)

In his motion for a new trial, Ellington argued thi?t following his retrial, he
discovered "new evidence" in the form of a previously-published textbook

8

authored

by Daily,

which,

Ellington

asserts,

contains

an

excerpt that

recommends against the use of the rotational mechanics formula utilized by Daily
to analyze accidents where the impact is less than 45 degrees, as was the case
in the BlazerlSubaru impact, according to Daily's testimony.

(R. Ex., pp.865-

868.)
Ellington's challenge fails because the district court properly exercised its
discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy any of the four prongs of
the controlling Drapeau standard.

Additionally, Ellington's attempts to draw

parallels between this case and Ellington I are misguided. First, Ellington has
made no allegation that Daily has committed perjury (see Appellant's brief, p.24
n.21), and thus, some of the specific concerns expressed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Ellington I, as well as the Court's modifications to the Drapeau standard
(which the Court held apply in instances of state witness perjury), are not
applicable in this case.

Second, unlike in Ellington I, Ellington did not himself

present any expert witness testimony during retrial to attempt to establish any
particular defense theory. Instead, Ellington's proposed "new evidence" has the
sole purpose of attempting to attack and impeach the state's expert and theory of
the case.

Finally, unlike in Ellington I, the existence of the proposed "newly

discovered evidence" had actually been disclosed to Ellington prior to his retrial.
For these reasons, Ellington has failed to show that he is entitled to a new trial.
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1.

The Prooosed Evidence Was Not Newly Discovered Or Unknown
To Ellington At The Time Of Trial

The first prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the evidence
was newly discovered or unknown to him at the time of trial. Drapeau, 97 at 691,
551 P.2d at 978.

The district court correctly utilized its discretion to find that

Ellington failed to satisfy this prong, noting that the state disclosed the existence
of the textbook in question to Ellington prior to trial. (R., p.837.)
The curriculum vitae of Daily, which Ellington does not dispute was
properly disclosed to the defense prior to trial, referenced the textbook in
question, Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction. (R. Ex., p.688.) The
state submits that evidence that is properly disclosed to the defense prior to trial
may never constitute evidence "unknown to the defendant at the time of trial" for
purposes of a Drapeau analysis.

If Ellington believes this disclosed evidence

was not properly examined or utilized by his trial counsel and retained defense
experts prior to his trial and conviction, he may raise a post-conviction ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, but he may not legitimately claim the evidence was
unknown to him at the time of trial.
Further, even if properly disclosed evidence can be characterized as being
"unknown to the defendant at the time of trial," for the purpose of the first
Drapeau prong, the state additionally asserts that the type of evidence proposed
in this case - previously published scholarship material - cannot generally
constitute "new evidence" for the purposes of a motion for a new trial where there
is no assertion of perjury. In trials containing expert testimony regarding complex
10

concepts such as accident reconstruction, parties would often have the ability,
post-trial, and with the benefit of hindsight, to identify already-existing scholarship
relating to trial issues.

Such available scholarship would, in many instances,

permit a defendant to move for a new trial in the hopes of presenting a more
tailored cross-examination, or an entirely new defense theory (perhaps to replace
a previously unsuccessful one).

Ellington I did not invite such a practice, nor

does any other legal authority.
Daily's previously-published textbook, which the state disclosed the
existence of prior to trial, cannot constitute evidence "unknown" to Ellington at the
time of trial. Ellington has therefore failed to show that the district court abused
its discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy the first Drapeau prong.

2.

Ellington's Failure To Learn Of The Proposed Evidence Prior To
Trial Was Due To His Own Lack Of Due Diligence

The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that his failure to
learn of the evidence prior to trial was not due to his own lack of due diligence.
Drapeau, 97 at 691, 551 P.2d at 97.

The district court properly utilized its

discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy this prong. (R., p.839).
On appeal, Ellington asserts that his failure to learn of the relevant
excerpts of the disclosed textbook prior to trial was not due to a lack of due
diligence. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-30.) Specifically, Ellington contends that he
could not be reasonably expected to know the contents of the sizable amount of
publications disclosed to him through Daily's curriculum vitae, and that it was not

11

4

until it reviewed Daily's supplemental report after the retrial commenced that the
defense had any reason to delve into Daily's written materials concerning
rotational mechanics. (Id.) Ellington's contentions fail for several reasons.
First, it was clear prior to trial, and prior to the preparation of Daily's
supplemental accident reconstruction report, that the impact of the BlazerlSubaru
collision on the subsequent movement of the Blazer would be an issue at trial.
Daily's initial reconstruction report, which was completed well in advance of trial,
stated that the BlazerlSubaru impact was relatively insignificant, caused only
"minor damage to both vehicles," that it was "unlikely there was any redirection
from this impact," and that following this collision, Ellington "turned to the left,
even though the eastbound lane was open to him, and continued to accelerate
towards the Honda Accord containing the Larsen Sisters."

(R. Ex., p.705.)

Ellington's retained defense expert David Rochford, whom Ellington elected not
to call as a witness at trial, completed his own accident reconstruction report, in
which he concluded that "[t]he force of the impact form the Subaru changed the
Blazer's direction of travel from southeast before impact to northeast after
impact." (R. Ex., p.800; see also Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) During his opening

Daily's supplemental report is dated January 15, 2012, which is three days prior
to the start of the retrial. (R. Ex., p.767; Trial Tr., Vol. I.) However, it is unclear
from the appellate record when the state actually disclosed Daily's supplemental
report. In his appellant's brief, Ellington asserts that the report was not disclosed
to the defense until after the retrial began. (Appellant's brief, p.11.) However, in
support of this assertion, Ellington cites only his own motion for a new trial, which
contains an unsupported conclusory statement about the timing of the disclosure
(R. Ex., p.867), and a portion of the transcript of the hearing on the motion for a
new trial, in which defense expert David Rochford testified merely that he had not
reviewed the supplemental report until the start of the retrial. (4/24/12 Tr., p.8,
L.24 - p.9, L.11).
4

12

statement, Ellington's attorney referenced the impact of the BlazerlSubaru
collision on the Blazer's subsequent movements. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.349, L.23 p.350, L.2) ("[H]e tried to get back on this side, going back into the proper lane of
traffic, but the Subaru rammed him from the driver's door right in front.

That

spins him, he comes out, he's flooring it, and he hits the Honda.") Due diligence
required Ellington to be familiar with the portions of the disclosed material
relevant to the Blazer's post-impact rotation.
Further, Ellington's trial tactics demonstrated a lack of due diligence in
recognizing the state's theory of the case and the significance of the disclosed
evidence, and a lack of any attempt to pursue remedies available before or
during trial to help him utilize the disclosed evidence and respond to Daily's
testimony.

Ellington apparently did not move for a continuance on the ground

that he needed time to review Daily's supplemental accident reconstruction
report, which referenced the rotational mechanics formula in question. 5

In

addition, Ellington did not ask for a continuance during or following Daily's
testimony, or object to the testimony as beyond the scope of required pretrial
disclosures. (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.849, L.5 - p.928, L.22.) Finally, Ellington
made

the

tactical

decision

to

replace

his

originally

retained

accident

reconstruction expert shortly before the second trial, apparently because that
expert had been recently retained by the state in a separate criminal case. (See

Ellington did move for a continuance
grounds of late police disclosure of notes
of Ellington's Blazer, and to pursue an
court's order denying Ellington's motion to
p. 19, L.13.)
5
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immediately before trial, but on the
concerning palm prints from the hood
interlocutory appeal from the district
dismiss. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.18, L.13 -

Appellant's brief, p.8 n.?)

Ellington's newly-retained expert may have been

unfamiliar with Daily's prior publications, and ill-prepared to assist Ellington's
defense in challenging Daily's testimony.
Ellington has also failed to support his apparent contention that where
evidentiary rules require the state to disclose the existence of a voluminous
amount of information, the defense should essentially have the opportunity to
complete its review of these disclosures after the trial is over.

At the very least,

it is reasonable to expect a defendant exercising due diligence to review a state
expert witnesses' qualifications and publications relevant to their expected
testimony prior to trial and/or to retain defense counsel capable of doing so.
Ellington's arguments illustrate some of the inherent issues related to an
application of the Drapeau standard to "newly discovered evidence" of this
nature. Where the state presents expert testimony to support its theory of the
case, the defendant has the opportunity to retain his own expert to support a
meaningful challenge to the state's expert and its theory of the case, or to
develop his own alternative theory.

Where the defendant reviews, only after

trial, previously-published and disclosed material that, upon hindsight, possibly
could have been utilized by the defense to impeach the state's expert, or to
develop and present an alternative defense theory, the state asserts that such
"evidence" may not generally satisfy the due diligence prong of the Drapeau
standard. Instead, the essence of Ellington's challenge is that his trial attorney
should have more thoroughly prepared for, or challenged the admission of,
Daily's testimony, or sought a continuance to better prepare for it, or retained a

14

more competent expert witness in a relevant field.

Such a chailenge is better

suited for a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Even if the previously disclosed and published textbook could constitute
evidence "unknown" to Ellington at the time of trial, Ellington cannot show that
the district court abused its discretion in concluding that he failed to utilize due
diligence to learn of the relevant excerpts from the textbook.

Ellington has

therefore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in concluding
that Ellington failed to satisfy this prong of the Drapeau standard.

3.

The Proposed Evidence Is Merely Impeaching, And Not Material

The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed
evidence is material to his guilt or innocence, and is not merely impeaching.
Drapeau, 97 at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.

Evidence may be both material and

impeaching. Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 74, 253 P.3d at 748. The Idaho Court of
Appeals has described the difference between impeachment evidence and
substantive evidence as follows:
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose
of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on
which the determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment
is that which is designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the
effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.
State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862,868-69,119 P.3d 637,643-44 (Ct. App. 2004).
In this case, the district court properly utilized its discretion in concluding
that Ellington failed to satisfy this prong. (R., pp.837-838).
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Evidence asserting that Daily may have incorrectly utilized a rotational
mechanics formula in reaching his conclusions was not materially supportive of
Ellington's guilt or innocence, or of any alternative defense theory or expert
testimony presented at trial. In fact, as the district court recognized (R., p.837),
Ellington presented no expert testimony at his second trial, and thus offered no
supported alternative defense theory regarding the impact of the BlazerlSubaru
collision on the Blazer's subsequent movements.

Nor did Ellington attempt to

utilize the content of Daily's textbook to re-calculate the impact of the
Honda/Subaru collision to support an alternative theory in the context of his
motion for a new trial.

Instead, Ellington offered the textbook excerpts only to

attack Daily's testimony, i.e., as impeachment evidence.
In this sense, Ellington's motion for a new trial is distinguishable from the
one analyzed by the Idaho Supreme Court following Ellington's first trial.

In

Ellington I, the Idaho Supreme Court held that evidence that Fred Rice testified
inconsistently with both his prior testimony and authored training materials was
both impeaching and materially substantive, because not only could it have been
used to impeach Rice's trial testimony, but it was also supportive of Ellington's
defense theory regarding reaction times, as presented by his own expert witness
at trial.

Ellington I, 151 Idaho at 73-74, 253 P.3d at 747-748.

In the retrial

however, Ellington's attacks on Daily's testimony supported no alternative expert-

supported theory.
Excerpts from Daily's textbook which Ellington asserts demonstrate that
Daily incorrectly utilized a formula in preparing his accident reconstruction
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reports, if introduced at trial, would merely be impeaching, and not material.
Therefore, Ellington has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
in concluding that he failed to satisfy the corresponding prong of the Drapeau
standard.

4.

The Proposed Evidence Would Not Probably Have Produced An
Acquittal

The next prong of the Drapeau standard requires a defendant seeking a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence to show that the proposed
evidence would have "probably" produced an acquittal if admitted at trial.
Drapeau, 97 at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.

In this case, the district court properly

utilized its discretion in concluding that Ellington failed to make such a showing.
(R., pp.838-839).

At the outset, and as the district court recognized (R., p.838), it is clear
that any evidence relating to the Blazer's movements immediately following its
impact with the Subaru was relevant only to the two aggravated battery charges,
which were based upon the Blazer's subsequent contact with the Honda
occupied by the Larsen sisters. Such evidence has no bearing on the seconddegree murder charge, which was based upon the Blazer's later contact with
Vonette Larson.

Following its impact with the Subaru, the Blazer struck the

Honda and pushed it back 48 feet over some period of time. (R. Ex. pp.672, 705;
see generally Trial Tr.) It was only after disengaging from the Honda, backing
up, and then traveling forward again, did the Blazer then strike Vonette Larsen.
(R. Ex. pp.672, 705; see generally Trial Tr.) Therefore, any evidence relating to
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the Blazer's rotation (or lack thereof) following the Subaru impact, and whether or
not Ellington had to actively turn the Blazer in order to subsequently engage in a
collision course with the Honda, is irrelevant to a determination of his later intent
in striking Vonette Larsen.

Even if this Court determines that Ellington has

satisfied each of the four Drapeu prongs with regard to the proposed "new
evidence" of the textbook excerpts, it should remand this case for a new trial only
upon the two aggravated battery charges. In any event, Ellington cannot show
that the admission of the textbook excerpts would have probably produced an
acquittal even on the two aggravated battery charges.
First, Ellington has failed to demonstrate that Daily's trial testimony was
actually inconsistent with the textbook excerpts. At trial, Daily testified that the
BlazerlSubaru collision would have had to rotate the Blazer 45 degrees in order
to put it on a direct collision course with the Honda. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.891, L.22p.892, L.3.) For this to occur, Daily testified, "it would require a speed change on
the part of the Subaru of about 41 to 42 miles an hour." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.892,
Ls.14-20.) Daily calculated this "41 to 42 miles an hour" based on principles of
rotational mechanics, which his supplemental accident reconstruction report
identified as including the formula w

= --)2FhO/I.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.891, L.i5 -

p.892, L.20; R. Ex., pp.767-771.) Daily testified that such a speed change would
have resulted in more extensive damage to the vehicles he observed in admitted
exhibit photos. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.892, L.21 - p.893, L.6.)
In the excerpt from Daily's textbook, Fundamentals of Traffic Crash

Reconstruction, w = --)2FhOIl is identified as Equation 9.67.
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(R. Ex., p.774.)

Example 9.14 in the textbook describes a Honda Accord striking the center of the
rear duals of a stationary semi-trailer combination at a right angle. (ld.) In the
example, the degree of the rotation of the semi-trailer around the king-pin is
known (4.27 degrees), and Equation 9.67 is utilized to determine w, the angular
velocity.

(R. Ex., pp.770, 774-775.) With the angular velocity known, another

equation is utilized to compute the t.v of the Honda. (R. Ex., pp.775-776.) With
the t.v of the Honda known, a third equation is utilized to compute the impact
speed.

(R. Ex., p.776.)

At the conclusion of this final calculation of impact

speed, the textbook contains an excerpt which reads:
The analysis just presented was for a perpendicular crash. If
the striking vehicle comes in at an angle different than 90°, then the
force acting to create the torque must be adjusted by a factor
defined as the sine of the angle of incidence. As the angle gets
more shallow (Le., close to zero), then the solution becomes very
sensitive to the angle and the presence of ground forces. It is
recommended not to attempt this type of analysis for collisions that
are less than 45°.
(R., Ex. p.948.)

Thus, while the textbook "recommended not to attempt" the "type of
analysis" regarding impact speed conducted in Example 9.14 where an accident
impact occurs at less than 45°, it did not expressly state that Equation 9.67 itself
could never be utilized in such an instance, let alone when conducting an
analysis under the circumstances of the BlazerlSubaru impact, where the goal
was to determine the "speed change" necessary to rotate a vehicle a certain
number of degrees.
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In a sworn affidavit submitted in support of the state's objection to
Ellington's motion for a new trial, Daily distinguished Example 9.14 from the
BlazerlSubaru impact:
Further, Mr. Rochford alleges the wrong formula was used to
evaluate the impact of the Blazer-Subaru collision. However, Mr.
Rochford bases his assessment on a formula used to compute
impact speed. Fundamentals of Traffic Crash Reconstruction, p.
308, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5.A. He fails to understand that the speed
change calculation I made was not of an impact speed. Rather, the
calculation is of the speed change that will provide enough force to
rotate the vehicle from one angle to another. Supplementary Report
calculations, pp. 1-3, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4.
(R. Ex., pp.696-697.)

At the hearing on the motion for the new trial, Daily, under oath, stood by
his calculations and trial testimony. (4/24/12 Tr., pA5, L.25 - p.81, L.7.) Daily
distinguished Example 9.14 in his textbook from the analysis he conducted on
the BlazerlSubaru collision, and expressed that an attempt to compare the two
was like "trying to mix apples and oranges."

(4/24112 Tr., p.53, L.20 - p.54,

L.12.) Example 9.14, Daily explained, was based on an experiment he set up, in
which the semi-trailer was designed to rotate not around the center of its mass,
like the Blazer did, but around its king-pin. (4/24/12 Tr., p.57, Ls.8-24.) In the
case of a collision such as the BlazerlSubaru impact, Daily explained, if the
impact came in at some other angle than 90 degrees, he would simply have to
calculate the length of the "lever arm," which he explained to be the force that
causes the rotation, which exists between the collision impact and the center of
mass of the vehicle.

(4/24112 Tr., p.54, Ls.13-25.)

Daily did make such an

adjustment in this case, and estimated the lever arm in the BlazerlSubaru
collision to be two feet. (4/24112 Tr., p.58, Ls.3-10.)
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Had Ellington attempted to make this challenge to Daily's testimony at
trial, he may have also been hindered by the comparative qualifications of Daily
and defense expert David Rochford, who testified at the hearing on the motion
for a new trial.

Daily has owned a traffic crash reconstruction and teaching

company for close to 30 years and has a master's degree in mechanical
engineering and a background in calculus and physics. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.849,
L.10 - p.851, L.10.) Daily authored or co-authored three textbooks on accident
reconstruction and is a frequent presenter, teacher, and writer on topics related
to the field.

(R. Ex., pp.680-692.)

While defense expert Rochford was an

experienced accident reconstructionist, he does not possess a math or science
degree, and had only actually utilized rotational mechanics once. (4/24/12 Tr.,
p.31, L.11 - p.37, L.11.)
Further, Daily did not rely exclusively on the rotational mechanics formula
in making his determination that the Blazer did not rotate so severely as to bring
it into an unavoidable collision course with the Honda. This determination was
also supported by evidence observed at the scene of the incident. Daily testified
about tire marks around the Blazer which indicated that it completed a "turning
movement with acceleration" following its impact with the Subaru. (Trial Tr., Vol.
II, p.878, L.23 - p.880, L.20; p.893, L.7 - p.894, L.3; p.911, L.24 - p.913, L.11.)
He also identified the lack of "scrub marks" on the vehicles, which would tend to
indicate that the impact between the Blazer and the Subaru was not severe
enough to cause one vehicle to displace another and change its direction. (Trial
Tr., Vol. II, p.881, Ls.2-19; p.888, L.12 - p.889, L.1; p.891, Ls.8-14.) Daily also
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observed only minor damage on both vehicles, which implied a slow-speed
collision, which he did not expect would have changed the motion of the Blazer
"in any significant way." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.882, L.10 - p.884, L.12; p.887, L.3 p.889, L.1.)
Finally, and unlike in Ellington I, there was no defense expert testimony at
the second trial presenting an alternative theory that that jury may have
gravitated towards if Ellington had convinced them to place less weight on Daily's
testimony. Even in the context of the motion for a new trial, in support of which
Ellington

submitted

calculations,

documentation

from

two

experts

criticizing

Daily's

Ellington appears to have never offered his own contrary

calculations and conclusions regarding the rotation of the Blazer.

(R. Ex.,

pp.865-868; see also Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)
Ellington cannot show that if he had been able to cross-examine Daily with
the textbook excerpts, that the jury would have "probably" both rejected Daily's
explanation for any apparent inconsistency, and also have ultimately acquitted
Ellington of the charged crimes. Because Ellington has failed to show that any
evidence regarding excerpts of Daily's textbook would "probably produce an
acquittal," he has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that Ellington failed to satisfy the corresponding prong of the Drapeau
standard.
Ellington has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a new trial based on evidence disclosed by the state prior
to trial which, he asserts, in hindsight, he would have used to attempt to impeach
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the state's reconstruction expert.

This Court must therefore affirm the district

court's order denying Ellington's motion for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
denial of Ellington's motion for a new trial.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2013.
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